DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Takalloo, Mahdi | ko |
dc.contributor.author | Bogyrbayeva, Aigerim | ko |
dc.contributor.author | Charkhgard, Hadi | ko |
dc.contributor.author | Kwon, Changhyun | ko |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-31T02:00:21Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-08-31T02:00:21Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2023-08-30 | - |
dc.date.created | 2023-08-30 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2021-07 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, v.28, no.4, pp.1658 - 1680 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0969-6016 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/311990 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The introduction of autonomous vehicles (AVs) to consumer markets will expedite the trend of car sharing and enable co-owning or co-leasing a car. In this paper, we consider a combinatorial auction market for fractional ownership of AVs, which is unique in two aspects. First, items are neither predefined nor discrete; rather, items are continuous time slots defined by bidders. Second, the spatial information of bidders should be incorporated within the winner determination problem (WDP) so that sharing a vehicle is indeed a viable plan. The consideration of spatial information increases the computational complexity significantly. We formulate the WDP, which plays a critical role in various auction designs and pricing schemes, for both discrete- and continuous-time settings. In terms of social welfare maximization, we show that the continuous-time model is superior to the discrete-time model. We provide a conflict-based reformulation of the continuous-time model, for which we develop an effective solution approach based on a heuristic and maximal clique based reformulations. Using samples of the 2010-2012 California Household Travel Survey, we verify that the proposed solution methods provide effective computational tools for the combinatorial auction with bidder-defined items. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.publisher | WILEY | - |
dc.title | Solving the winner determination problem in combinatorial auctions for fractional ownership of autonomous vehicles | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000564473400001 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85090067912 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.citation.volume | 28 | - |
dc.citation.issue | 4 | - |
dc.citation.beginningpage | 1658 | - |
dc.citation.endingpage | 1680 | - |
dc.citation.publicationname | INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN OPERATIONAL RESEARCH | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/itor.12868 | - |
dc.contributor.localauthor | Kwon, Changhyun | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Takalloo, Mahdi | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Bogyrbayeva, Aigerim | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Charkhgard, Hadi | - |
dc.description.isOpenAccess | N | - |
dc.type.journalArticle | Article | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | fractional ownership | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | combinatorial auction | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | bidder-defined items | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | clique | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | ALGORITHM | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | COST | - |
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