Preferences for redistribution in a relative effort game and information effects상대적 노력 게임에서 재분배 선호도를 결정하는 요인과 정보 효과 분석

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In this paper, we explore what determines preferences for redistribution in a relative effort game setting, and we show how an addition of information can lead people to re-optimize their choices for redistribution. We designed a lab experiment where the payment was determined by the relative effort put to work within a group. In this game setting, we show that self-interest is a highly significant motive that affects the individual preference for redistribution. Other than this motive, some of our subjects showed an insurance motive to avoid a potential risk. How fair subjects think of their payment was also a significant factor. When subjects were asked to decide whether to redistribute for another group, a majority answered consistently with the previous redistribution preference for their own group. Lastly, we find that the effect of an information nudge is different between high-paid subjects and low-paid subjects, and also between redistribution preferences for their own group and those for another group. Specifically, when we showed a figure which revealed the game payment distribution of their own group, more high-paid subjects chose to redistribute for their own group, and more low-paid subjects chose to redistribute for another group.
Advisors
Kim, Ji Heeresearcher김지희researcher
Description
한국과학기술원 :기술경영학부,
Publisher
한국과학기술원
Issue Date
2017
Identifier
325007
Language
eng
Description

학위논문(석사) - 한국과학기술원 : 기술경영학부, 2017.8,[iii, 19 p. :]

Keywords

Preferences for redistribution▼arelative effort game▼aself-interest▼ainsurance motive▼ainformation nudge▼ainformation effect; 재분배 선호도▼a상대적 노력 게임▼a이기심▼a보험적 동기▼a정보 넛지▼a정보 효과

URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/242909
Link
http://library.kaist.ac.kr/search/detail/view.do?bibCtrlNo=718562&flag=dissertation
Appears in Collection
MG-Theses_Master(석사논문)
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