DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Seog, S. Hun | ko |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-03-08T18:28:03Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2013-03-08T18:28:03Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2012-02-06 | - |
dc.date.created | 2012-02-06 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009-06 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, v.76, no.2, pp.279 - 294 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-4367 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/93912 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This article attempts to understand the outcomes when each party of an insurance contract simultaneously has superior information. I assume that policyholders have superior information about specific risks while insurers have superior information about general risks. I find that low-general-risk policyholders purchase insurance, while high-general-risk policyholders are self-insured. Among the low-general-risk policyholders, high-specific-risk policyholders purchase full insurance, while low-specific-risk policyholders purchase partial insurance. When insurers can strategically publicize their information, efficiency is improved because high-general-risk policyholders purchase actuarially fair insurance. The market segmentation is also found based on the general-risk type and the publicizing of information. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.publisher | Wiley-Blackwell | - |
dc.subject | ADVERSE SELECTION | - |
dc.subject | RISK | - |
dc.subject | EQUILIBRIA | - |
dc.title | Insurance Markets With Differential Information | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000265772900003 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-65549083054 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.citation.volume | 76 | - |
dc.citation.issue | 2 | - |
dc.citation.beginningpage | 279 | - |
dc.citation.endingpage | 294 | - |
dc.citation.publicationname | JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/j.1539-6975.2009.01299.x | - |
dc.contributor.localauthor | Seog, S. Hun | - |
dc.type.journalArticle | Article | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | ADVERSE SELECTION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | RISK | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | EQUILIBRIA | - |
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