DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Chae, Suchan | ko |
dc.contributor.author | Heidhues, P | ko |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-03-03T15:56:13Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2013-03-03T15:56:13Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2012-02-06 | - |
dc.date.created | 2012-02-06 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004-07 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, v.48, no.1, pp.37 - 53 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0165-4896 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/79330 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We propose a solution for bargaining models where groups of individuals bargain with each other. The solution constitutes a Nash solution within as well as across groups. An individual may be worse off bargaining as a member of a group than bargaining alone (the joint-bargaining paradox) in a pure-bargaining situation. It can be, however, profitable to bargain as a group in a non-pure bargaining situation. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.publisher | ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV | - |
dc.subject | EQUILIBRIUM | - |
dc.title | A group bargaining solution | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000221376500004 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-1942508966 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.citation.volume | 48 | - |
dc.citation.issue | 1 | - |
dc.citation.beginningpage | 37 | - |
dc.citation.endingpage | 53 | - |
dc.citation.publicationname | MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.11.002 | - |
dc.contributor.localauthor | Chae, Suchan | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Heidhues, P | - |
dc.type.journalArticle | Article | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | group bargaining | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | nash bargaining solution | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | joint-bargaining paradox | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | axiomatic bargaining solution | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | coalitions | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | EQUILIBRIUM | - |
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