(A) study on cryptographic protocols for RFID tags

Abstract

$It{Radio Frequency Identification}$ (RFID) is an emerging technology to replace the Barcode technology. The technology can be used for many powerful applications including automatic item tracking, smart home appliances, anti-counterfeiting, $\It{etc}$. The key idea is to attach each and every item with an RFID tag which can be read by RFID readers via radio communication. Each RFID tag is a low-cost device capable of emitting a unique number which will be served as the identification information of an RFID-tagged item in a database at the back-end server. Unfortunately, a widespread adoption of RFID is uncertain because of its inherent threats in security which includes tag cloning and privacy violation. It turns out that these two security threats come from the very basic operation of an RFID tag, that is to send the identification of an RFID-tagged item (hereafter referred to as $\It{Electronic Product Code}$ (EPC)) in cleartext. This is an inherent security risk since we depend on the EPC number to recognize a product as genuine or fake. An attacker equipped with a compatible reader can scan many RFID tags to collect a large number of EPC numbers. He then can produce RFID tags which emit exactly the same EPCs he has collected. These tags are called $\It{cloned tags}$. The cloned tags can be attached to counterfeited items which should be recognized as genuine items. The core functionality of an RFID tag also raises privacy concern. As each EPC number is unique, an attacker with a compatible reader can recognize and track RFID tags which leads to privacy violation of a person carrying tagged items. Denial or disruption of service might also affect an RFID system. The reasons are two-fold: RFID requires a huge number of tag to be deployed; RFID is a wireless technology at its core and therefore is subject to various sources of interference and jamming. To deal with the security problems of RFID, the use of cryptographic protocols is required. However, des...