The signals outside directors send to foreign investors: Evidence from Korea

Cited 35 time in webofscience Cited 37 time in scopus
  • Hit : 989
  • Download : 176
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorRhee, Mooweonko
dc.contributor.authorLee, Ji-Hwanko
dc.date.accessioned2008-04-17T04:01:19Z-
dc.date.available2008-04-17T04:01:19Z-
dc.date.created2012-02-06-
dc.date.created2012-02-06-
dc.date.issued2008-01-
dc.identifier.citationCORPORATE GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, v.16, no.1, pp.41 - 51-
dc.identifier.issn0964-8410-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10203/3935-
dc.description.abstractManuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This study explores a signaling role of the demographic composition of a firm's outside director by examining how the composition influences the growth of foreigners' investment in the firm. Research Findings/Insights: Using archival data from a panel sample of 96 large Korean firms between 2000 and 2003, our analysis shows that the growth of foreign ownership is positively affected if a higher proportion of outside directors hold advanced foreign degrees, if a higher proportion of outside directors have former or current affiliations with governmental organizations, or if a higher proportion of outside directors have job experience in the same industry. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our theoretical perspective and supportive findings suggest that the role of outside directors is not confined to implementing the tasks stipulated as a corporate governance mechanism; they also can be signals that inform a market audience (foreign investors in our study) of the extent to which outside directors may provide a firm with a knowledge base, social status, and decision control. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study suggests several practical implications, prompting growing interest in the role of outside directors as one of the most effective vehicles for improving corporate governance and symbolic management. In addition, it offers insights to policy makers interested in establishing and updating guidelines that inform firms of desirable board composition according to their strategic demands.-
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherWILEY-BLACKWELL-
dc.subjectCORPORATE GOVERNANCE-
dc.subjectFINANCIAL PERFORMANCE-
dc.subjectSHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM-
dc.subjectEMERGING MARKETS-
dc.subjectHOME BIAS-
dc.subjectBOARD-
dc.subjectFIRMS-
dc.subjectIMITATION-
dc.subjectKNOWLEDGE-
dc.subjectMODEL-
dc.titleThe signals outside directors send to foreign investors: Evidence from Korea-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.wosid000253706900004-
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-40249090603-
dc.type.rimsART-
dc.citation.volume16-
dc.citation.issue1-
dc.citation.beginningpage41-
dc.citation.endingpage51-
dc.citation.publicationnameCORPORATE GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00663.x-
dc.embargo.liftdate9999-12-31-
dc.embargo.terms9999-12-31-
dc.contributor.localauthorLee, Ji-Hwan-
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthorRhee, Mooweon-
dc.description.isOpenAccessN-
dc.type.journalArticleArticle-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorboard composition-
dc.subject.keywordAuthoroutside directors-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorKorea-
dc.subject.keywordPlusCORPORATE GOVERNANCE-
dc.subject.keywordPlusFINANCIAL PERFORMANCE-
dc.subject.keywordPlusSHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM-
dc.subject.keywordPlusEMERGING MARKETS-
dc.subject.keywordPlusHOME BIAS-
dc.subject.keywordPlusBOARD-
dc.subject.keywordPlusFIRMS-
dc.subject.keywordPlusIMITATION-
dc.subject.keywordPlusKNOWLEDGE-
dc.subject.keywordPlusMODEL-
Appears in Collection
MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
Files in This Item
This item is cited by other documents in WoS
⊙ Detail Information in WoSⓡ Click to see webofscience_button
⊙ Cited 35 items in WoS Click to see citing articles in records_button

qr_code

  • mendeley

    citeulike


rss_1.0 rss_2.0 atom_1.0