(A) study on methodology for applying physical protection against insider threats in nuclear facilities

Abstract

Mitigating insider threats in nuclear facilities is a major issue of nuclear security. Nevertheless, there are not many countries that have established an excellent response system for insider threats. This thesis reviews the international standards used to establish existing insider threat response systems and proposes a methodology to supplement the existing guidelines. A methodology was developed that takes a policy approach (country specific factors) and incorporates and expands on the existing technological approach (e.g., probability and time analysis) to nuclear security. A key benefit is that this methodology takes into account a country’s national security environment. In addition, by introducing the concepts of application and effectiveness, it was possible to quantify the efficiency of technologies, which were previously difficult to consider when developing a physical protection system. The proposed methodology was applied to two countries, and the results were analyzed and compared. The results verified the suitability of the methodology by showing how different applications and their effectiveness depended on the two country’s national security environments - even though both countries used the same response technology. In addition, the trial application of the methodology identified supplemental needs such as, evaluation cycle, survey target (national security experts), and matters to be taken into account prior to applying the methodology.