On the Shapley-like payoff mechanisms in peer-assisted services with multiple content providers

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This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition structure consisting of multiple providers with many assisting peers, where peers assist providers to reduce the operational cost in content distribution. To distribute the profit from cost reduction to players (i.e., providers and peers), we then establish a generalized formula for individual payoffs when a
Publisher
Springer
Issue Date
2011-04
Language
English
Citation

2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011, pp.397 - 412

ISSN
1867-8211
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_28
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/306916
Appears in Collection
EE-Conference Papers(학술회의논문)
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