DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | 김채현 | ko |
dc.contributor.author | 이은서 | ko |
dc.contributor.author | 이준엽 | ko |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-03-08T08:50:06Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-03-08T08:50:06Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-03-03 | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-03-03 | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-03-03 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020-09 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | 재무관리연구, v.37, no.3, pp.89 - 108 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1225-0759 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/281389 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this study, we examine the effect of co-opted boards on cost stickiness. Co-opted directors are defined as those who are hired after a CEO takes office. We measure board co-option in two ways: the number of co-opted board members divided by the size of the board, and the sum of the co-opted directors’ tenure divided by the sum of all directors’ tenure. Cost stickiness occurs when a firm’s costs increase with an increase in activity level to a greater degree than they decrease with a decrease in activity level. We measure cost stickiness using an operating cost stickiness model. Based on a sample of 18,237 firm-year observations in the United States for the period 1995 to 2015, we show that cost stickiness increases with the proportion of co-opted board members. In addition, we show that board co-option increases cost stickiness by undermining independent directors’ monitoring effectiveness. Finally, strong governance mitigates the positive association between co-opted boards and cost stickiness. Overall, our findings are consistent with evidence from prior studies that co-opted boards represent weak board monitoring effectiveness. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.publisher | 한국재무관리학회 | - |
dc.title | 코옵티드(Co-Opted)이사와 원가의 하방경직성 | - |
dc.title.alternative | Co-Opted Boards and Cost Stickiness | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.citation.volume | 37 | - |
dc.citation.issue | 3 | - |
dc.citation.beginningpage | 89 | - |
dc.citation.endingpage | 108 | - |
dc.citation.publicationname | 재무관리연구 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.22510/kjofm.2020.37.3.003 | - |
dc.identifier.kciid | ART002631703 | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | 이은서 | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | 이준엽 | - |
dc.description.isOpenAccess | Y | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Co-Opted Boards | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Cost Stickiness | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Agency Problems | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | 코옵티드 이사회 | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | 원가의 하방경직성 | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | 대리인 문제 | - |
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