DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl | ko |
dc.contributor.author | Shin, Sean Seunghun | ko |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-10-16T00:55:14Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-10-16T00:55:14Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2020-09-25 | - |
dc.date.created | 2020-09-25 | - |
dc.date.created | 2020-09-25 | - |
dc.date.created | 2020-09-25 | - |
dc.date.created | 2020-09-25 | - |
dc.date.created | 2020-09-25 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020-12 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL FINANCE, v.59, pp.68 - 87 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0927-5398 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/276621 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We examine the extent to which shareholders strategically allow a weak governance structure in response to increasing competition pressures in the product market. We treat acquisitions by rival firms as shocks that increase threats in a competitive product market. We find that firms adopt greater entrenchment provisions when there are greater competition threats. Moreover, firms with high institutional ownership – especially by dedicated investors – and board independence within the compensation committee are particularly aggressive, which is consistent with our theory that aggressive behavior represents a strategic decision by shareholders. Finally, we find positive relationship between the adoption of entrenchment provisions and firm's future performance, but only for the adoption under relatively severe competitive pressures. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.publisher | ELSEVIER | - |
dc.title | Does Product Market Competition Affect Corporate Governance? Evidence from Corporate Takeovers | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000594531600004 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85091501382 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.citation.volume | 59 | - |
dc.citation.beginningpage | 68 | - |
dc.citation.endingpage | 87 | - |
dc.citation.publicationname | JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL FINANCE | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jempfin.2020.09.001 | - |
dc.contributor.localauthor | Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Shin, Sean Seunghun | - |
dc.description.isOpenAccess | N | - |
dc.type.journalArticle | Article | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Corporate governance | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Product market competition | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Takeover | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | HORIZONTAL MERGERS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | AGENCY COSTS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | ACQUISITIONS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | KNOWLEDGE | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | DIRECTORS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | FIRM | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | OWNERSHIP | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | RIVALS | - |
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