(The) impact of CEO contractual protection on asymmetric cost behavior최고경영자(CEO)의 계약적 보호와 원가 하방경직성의 관련성 연구
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | Yoo, Choong Yuel | - |
| dc.contributor.advisor | 류충렬 | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Cho, Seung Hyun | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-08-28T02:39:14Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2019-08-28T02:39:14Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2019 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://library.kaist.ac.kr/search/detail/view.do?bibCtrlNo=844693&flag=dissertation | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/265630 | - |
| dc.description | 학위논문(석사) - 한국과학기술원 : 경영공학부, 2019.2,[ii, 42 p. :] | - |
| dc.description.abstract | This study examines whether executives’ contractual protection, in the form of employment agreements, and standalone severance pay agreements, affects asymmetric sensitivity of costs to activity (i.e., “cost stickiness). I hypothesize that firms with CEO contractual protection will have the less extent of cost stickiness than other firms. Consistent with the prediction, I find that CEO protection is negatively associated with the degree of cost stickiness. Moreover, I confirm that the effect of CEO contractual protection on sticky cost behavior is valid even when CEO protection is stratified. Overall, these findings suggest that CEO contractual protection significantly affects firms’ cost behaviors. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | 한국과학기술원 | - |
| dc.subject | Cost stickiness▼aagency problem▼aemployment agreement▼aseverance pay agreement▼acontractual protection | - |
| dc.subject | 원가 하방경직성▼a대리인 이론▼a고용 계약▼a퇴직 계약▼a계약적 보호 | - |
| dc.title | (The) impact of CEO contractual protection on asymmetric cost behavior | - |
| dc.title.alternative | 최고경영자(CEO)의 계약적 보호와 원가 하방경직성의 관련성 연구 | - |
| dc.type | Thesis(Master) | - |
| dc.identifier.CNRN | 325007 | - |
| dc.description.department | 한국과학기술원 :경영공학부, | - |
| dc.contributor.alternativeauthor | 조승현 | - |
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