DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | Kang, Brent Byunghoon | - |
dc.contributor.advisor | 강병훈 | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lee, Seongman | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-06-20T06:25:03Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-06-20T06:25:03Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://library.kaist.ac.kr/search/detail/view.do?bibCtrlNo=675497&flag=dissertation | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/243498 | - |
dc.description | 학위논문(석사) - 한국과학기술원 : 정보보호대학원, 2017.2,[iv, 25 p. :] | - |
dc.description.abstract | Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) is considered a highly threatening exploit technique. For mitigating ROP attacks, many researchers have proposed fine-grained Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR). And it is considered as an efficient defense mechanism for ROP attacks. However, new advanced ROP attack called the JIT-ROP circumvents the fine-grained ASLR by disassembling the code pages repeatedly in runtime. For Mitigating the JIT-ROP attack, many researchers have proposed leakage-resilient defenses. In this paper, we introduce Twisted-Stack, a new kind of approach | - |
dc.description.abstract | that randomizes the stack pointer which plays a role as the program counter in ROP attacks. More specifically, for mitigating the JIT-ROP attack, our solution places multiple stacks and randomly switches the stack at each call and ret site. By randomly switching the stacks, the adversary loses the control of the stack pointer at the ret site. If the stack pointer is lost, it makes it harder for the adversary to run the gadget. Even if one gadget is executed, the adversary loses the control of the stack pointer. Thus he will fail to execute the gadgets reliably. It is in effect equivalent to breaking the gadget chain. We have implemented Twisted-Stack as a compiler-based solution. And, we have evaluated Twisted-Stack using SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suites which measure the CPU-bound performance overhead. In our experiments, Twisted-Stack imposes a run-time overhead of 28% and a file-size overhead of 44%. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | 한국과학기술원 | - |
dc.subject | 반환 지향형 프로그래밍 | - |
dc.subject | 실시간 반환 지향형 프로그래밍 공격 | - |
dc.subject | 메모리 노출 공격 완화 | - |
dc.subject | 가젯 제거 | - |
dc.subject | 랜덤화 | - |
dc.subject | Return-Oriented Programming | - |
dc.subject | JIT-ROP | - |
dc.subject | leakage-resilient | - |
dc.subject | Gadget-less | - |
dc.subject | Randomization | - |
dc.title | Twisted-Stack | - |
dc.title.alternative | 스택 랜덤화를 통한 (실시간) 리턴 지향 프로그래밍 공격 완화 | - |
dc.type | Thesis(Master) | - |
dc.identifier.CNRN | 325007 | - |
dc.description.department | 한국과학기술원 :정보보호대학원, | - |
dc.contributor.alternativeauthor | 이성만 | - |
dc.title.subtitle | Stack randomization for mitigating (Just-in-time) return oriented programming | - |
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