(A) conceptual safety and security integrated design methodology for nuclear power plant

Abstract

The Fukushima accident revealed the critical vulnerabilities in nuclear safety. A Fukushima-like nuclear accident need not be caused by natural disaster

it could very well be caused by terrorist attack on, for example, a nuclear power plant’s emergency cooling system. The safety vulnerabilities identified post Fukushima which included inconsistent or inefficient procedures, lack of personnel training, lack of communication between authorities, lack of coherent strategy, gaps in the legal framework and inadequate equipment are applicable to nuclear security as well. There are many common linkages between safety and security and it is important to treat nuclear safety and security as interrelated subjects, mutually reinforcing and fully integrated. Hence, the synergy between the two should be maximized. Consideration should also be given to the facts that although some safety systems can enhance security, at times security systems have been seen to interfere with safety practices and vice versa. Hence, it is essential that an integrated approach towards nuclear safety and security be adopted. The purpose of this study is to introduce a conceptual safety and security integrated design methodology based on probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). The application of this method is focused on pressurized light water nuclear power plant. From the results, by this design methodology, it enhances the common goal of safety and security that is the protection of the public and the environment, even with consideration of both safety and security. That is to say, study also describes the similarities and differences between nuclear safety and security. Further, it suggests the ways and methods to increase the synergy between nuclear safety and security in early design stages.