(A) new approach for nuclear proliferation risk modeling

Abstract

Nuclear proliferation history implies that the nuclear proliferation risk of a country should be based on both current capability and motivational factors. Previous studies have attempted to analyze the relative importance of the determinants of nuclear proliferation using the historical information of the countries under consideration, or with developed nuclear weapons. Hypotheses have been suggested and supported by quantitative analysis of proliferation history. Based on examining how a country’s specific situation leads to specific scenarios of nuclear proliferation, relevant variables have been developed along with the supporting data. However, in previous models the relationship between capability and motivation and the time-dependent nature of nuclear weapons projects were not considered. The dynamic aspect of a decision-making process in a state and the effectiveness of international organization for nuclear nonproliferation are still not well characterized. These limitations result in observing a mixed result for testing the hypotheses regarding the causes of nuclear proliferation. Also, weaknesses in statistical approaches regarding the methods and dataset also cause uncertainty in their results. Although there have been several studies pointing out these problems, quantitative examinations have not been conducted to analyze the uncertainties of the current methodology. Based on a comprehensive review of previous studies of the causes of nuclear proliferation, this study ana-lyzed the challenges in nuclear proliferation modeling in both qualitative and quantitative ways. The pros and cons of various approaches and results were evaluated. The sources of uncertainty were categorized, and the robustness of previous studies were examined. From the analysis results, implications in classifying the states’ current capability and the time-dependent nature of nuclear proliferation were addressed. Finally, the study analyzed the remaining research questions in this field and suggests the direction for future research in nuclear proliferation risk modeling.