Loss-leader pricing and upgrades

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dc.contributor.authorIn, Younghwan-
dc.contributor.authorWright, Julian-
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-11T08:12:45Z-
dc.date.available2014-11-11T08:12:45Z-
dc.date.created2014-01-10-
dc.date.issued2013-08-04-
dc.identifier.citationAsian Meeting of the Econometric Society (AMES 2013), v., no., pp. --
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10203/190667-
dc.description.abstractA new theory of loss-leader pricing is provided in which firms advertise low (below cost) prices for certain goods to signal that their other unadvertised (substitute) goods are not priced too high. The theory is applied to the pricing of upgrades. The results contrast with most existing loss-leader theories in that firms make a loss on some consumers (who buy the basic version of the good) and a profit on others (who buy the upgrade).-
dc.languageENG-
dc.publisherThe Econometric Society-
dc.titleLoss-leader pricing and upgrades-
dc.typeConference-
dc.type.rimsCONF-
dc.citation.publicationnameAsian Meeting of the Econometric Society (AMES 2013)-
dc.identifier.conferencecountrySingapore-
dc.contributor.localauthorIn, Younghwan-
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthorWright, Julian-
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KGSM-Conference Papers(학술회의논문)
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