AMBIGUITY AND SECOND-ORDER BELIEF
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) wrote a classic characterization of Subjective expected utility theory. This paper employs the same domain for preference and a closely related (but weaker) set of atoms to characterize preferences that rise second-order beliefs, (beliefs, over probability measures) Such preferences are of interest because they accommodate Ellsberg-type behavior.
- Publisher
- WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING
- Issue Date
- 2009-09
- Language
- English
- Article Type
- Article
- Keywords
DECISION-MAKING; UNRELIABLE PROBABILITIES; 2-STAGE LOTTERIES; EXPECTED UTILITY; DYNAMIC CHOICE; REDUCTION; RISK; UNCERTAINTY; PRINCIPLE; AVERSION
- Citation
ECONOMETRICA, v.77, no.5, pp.1575 - 1605
- ISSN
- 0012-9682
- Appears in Collection
- MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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