DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | 윤경림 | - |
dc.contributor.author | 최현우 | - |
dc.contributor.author | 안병훈 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-03-15T22:28:10Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2013-03-15T22:28:10Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2012-02-06 | - |
dc.date.issued | 1995-04 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | 대한산업공학회/한국경영과학회 1995년도 춘계공동학술대회, v., no., pp. - | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/124559 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines characteristics of the accounting rate system whereby international telecommunications carriers settle net balances of account arising from bilateral traffic flows. Using a two stage game model, we explain problems in the system: growing traffic and payment imbalances, and resulting conflicts regarding accounting rates between carriers of, say, developed and developing countries. In this paper, we view the problems as a splitting-a-pie game in which one carrier cannot get more without a loss of the other, but total pie size depends upon the accounting rate. Therefore, a natural solution should be inevitably of a Coasian-type to establish a mutual agreement. In this regard, we first derive an efficient accounting rate, in the sense that it can make both carriers better off. Next we suggest some ways of attaining the efficient outcome. Regulatory and policy implications are also discussed. | - |
dc.language | KOR | - |
dc.publisher | 한국경영과학회 | - |
dc.title | 국제통신에서 사업자간 정산수익분할에 대한 갈등과 비효율성 | - |
dc.title.alternative | The accounting revenue division in international telecommunications : conflicts and inefficiencies | - |
dc.type | Conference | - |
dc.type.rims | CONF | - |
dc.citation.publicationname | 대한산업공학회/한국경영과학회 1995년도 춘계공동학술대회 | - |
dc.identifier.conferencecountry | South Korea | - |
dc.identifier.conferencecountry | South Korea | - |
dc.contributor.localauthor | 안병훈 | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | 윤경림 | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | 최현우 | - |
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