DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Ku, Hyun-Mo | ko |
dc.contributor.author | Kim, Jae-Cheol | ko |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-04-15T06:44:14Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2008-04-15T06:44:14Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2012-02-06 | - |
dc.date.created | 2012-02-06 | - |
dc.date.issued | 1998 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE, v.7, no.2, pp.173 - 183 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1059-0560 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/3881 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Competing with a vertically integrated incumbent that monopolizes a vital input typically requires access to the input for the supply of final services. The possibility of anti-competitive behavior makes the pricing of access one of the most important issues in the network industries. The existence of multiple entrants seeking access creates a yet another requirement of non-discriminatory to regulatory agencies who in general cannot make discrimination between one entrant and another. The present paper aims to analyze how this non-discriminatory requirement can be dealt with in deriving the optimal access pricing rules in relation to the ECPR formulas. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
dc.publisher | Elsevier Inc. | - |
dc.title | Non-discriminatory access pricing for multiple entrants | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-11544285105 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.citation.volume | 7 | - |
dc.citation.issue | 2 | - |
dc.citation.beginningpage | 173 | - |
dc.citation.endingpage | 183 | - |
dc.citation.publicationname | INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE | - |
dc.embargo.liftdate | 9999-12-31 | - |
dc.embargo.terms | 9999-12-31 | - |
dc.contributor.localauthor | Kim, Jae-Cheol | - |
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Ku, Hyun-Mo | - |
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