An Incentive Contract with Asymmetric Information
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Jung Choong-Young | ko |
| dc.contributor.author | Kim Jae-Cheol | ko |
| dc.contributor.author | Lee Sang-Ho | ko |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2008-04-15T02:41:33Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2008-04-15T02:41:33Z | - |
| dc.date.created | 2012-02-06 | - |
| dc.date.created | 2012-02-06 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2000-06 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC JOURNAL, v.14, no.1, pp.99 - 110 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1016-8737 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10203/3859 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | This Paper considers the problem of designing an optimal incentive contract between a retailer and a manufacturer when the former has private information about demand and its own cost. Based on a multi-period framework, we show that the incentive franchise contract can bring about the fist-best outcome of vertical integration when the retailer has complete information about consumers preferences. [L42, D8] | - |
| dc.language | English | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
| dc.publisher | 한국국제경제학회 | - |
| dc.title | An Incentive Contract with Asymmetric Information | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.type.rims | ART | - |
| dc.citation.volume | 14 | - |
| dc.citation.issue | 1 | - |
| dc.citation.beginningpage | 99 | - |
| dc.citation.endingpage | 110 | - |
| dc.citation.publicationname | INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC JOURNAL | - |
| dc.embargo.liftdate | 9999-12-31 | - |
| dc.embargo.terms | 9999-12-31 | - |
| dc.contributor.localauthor | Kim Jae-Cheol | - |
| dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Jung Choong-Young | - |
| dc.contributor.nonIdAuthor | Lee Sang-Ho | - |
- Appears in Collection
- MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
- Files in This Item
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.