An Incentive Contract with Asymmetric Information

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dc.contributor.authorJung Choong-Youngko
dc.contributor.authorKim Jae-Cheolko
dc.contributor.authorLee Sang-Hoko
dc.date.accessioned2008-04-15T02:41:33Z-
dc.date.available2008-04-15T02:41:33Z-
dc.date.created2012-02-06-
dc.date.created2012-02-06-
dc.date.issued2000-06-
dc.identifier.citationINTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC JOURNAL, v.14, no.1, pp.99 - 110-
dc.identifier.issn1016-8737-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10203/3859-
dc.description.abstractThis Paper considers the problem of designing an optimal incentive contract between a retailer and a manufacturer when the former has private information about demand and its own cost. Based on a multi-period framework, we show that the incentive franchise contract can bring about the fist-best outcome of vertical integration when the retailer has complete information about consumers preferences. [L42, D8]-
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisher한국국제경제학회-
dc.titleAn Incentive Contract with Asymmetric Information-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.type.rimsART-
dc.citation.volume14-
dc.citation.issue1-
dc.citation.beginningpage99-
dc.citation.endingpage110-
dc.citation.publicationnameINTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC JOURNAL-
dc.embargo.liftdate9999-12-31-
dc.embargo.terms9999-12-31-
dc.contributor.localauthorKim Jae-Cheol-
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthorJung Choong-Young-
dc.contributor.nonIdAuthorLee Sang-Ho-
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MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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