Dynamic analysis and mitigation of GPS spoofing vulnerabilities in cyber-physical systems

Abstract

however, studies have not yet been conducted on the specific effect son CPSs by GPS spoofing attacks. This study explores GPS spoofing vulnerabilities in existing CPSs and investigates a GPS spoofing detection method to mitigate the threats. It begins with the design and implementation of an advanced GPS spoofer for dynamic analysis based on a software-defined radio. Using this spoofer, this study analyzes GPS spoofing vulnerabilities in representative automated vehicles, such as consumer drones, cars that contains advanced driver-assistance systems, and GPS clocks used in infrastructures such as power grids

it further explores the impact of GPS spoofing attacks on these systems. Lastly, to mitigate the GPS spoofing threats of these systems, a new GPS spoofing detection technique was studied, that can be applied to existing CPSs without any hardware modification.

A cyber-physical system (CPS) is a system that connects the cyber world with the physical world by controlling the physical systems through actuators, based on their state, monitored by sensors. This connection improves the scalability, effectiveness, and reliability of the systems to enable CPSs to be widely applied to logistics, infrastructure, healthcare, and so on. The global positioning system (GPS) is an important system used in many CPSs, and precise location and time information from the GPS is essential for their operation. However, civilian GPS receivers are exposed to GPS spoofing threats that generate counterfeit GPS signals and manipulate location and time information, which can be a severe security threat to CPSs