Public Information and Global Games with Strategic Complements and Substitutes

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This study examines the effects of public information on players’ actions in global games with strategic complements and substitutes. Specifically, we consider the protest game, wherein a group of citizens decide whether to participate in a protest against a government. After observing private signals and a public signal about the government's strength, each citizen decides whether or not to participate in the protest. The participation can be both strategic complements and strategic substitutes because the number of protesters increases both the probability of protest success and the probability of a government crackdown. We find that the likelihood of protest success decreases (increases) with the precision of the public signal if the government's strength is expected to be strong (weak). However, increasing the precision of the public signal is more likely to reduce citizens’ participation as protest decisions exhibit more strategic substitutability. © 2020 Elsevier B.V.
Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Issue Date
2021-02
Language
English
Article Type
Article
Citation

ECONOMICS LETTERS, v.199, no.C, pp.109703

ISSN
0165-1765
DOI
10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109703
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/281670
Appears in Collection
MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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