When to go it alone: Examining post-conversion performance of international joint ventures

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dc.contributor.authorChang, Sea-Jinko
dc.date.accessioned2019-08-21T07:20:15Z-
dc.date.available2019-08-21T07:20:15Z-
dc.date.created2019-08-19-
dc.date.created2019-08-19-
dc.date.created2019-08-19-
dc.date.issued2019-08-
dc.identifier.citationJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES, v.50, no.6, pp.998 - 1020-
dc.identifier.issn0047-2506-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10203/264354-
dc.description.abstractThis study examines the decision to convert international joint ventures to either foreign or local wholly owned entities and the subsequent impact on performance from the perspective of incomplete contract theory. With China's relaxation of the joint venture requirement, foreign partners are more likely to take full control and thereby improve performance in provinces with fewer institutional barriers and industries with high intangible asset intensity, while local partners are more likely to do so in provinces with higher institutional barriers and low intangible asset intensity. Furthermore, the performance improvement is more salient when transitioning from foreign minority-local majority joint ventures.-
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.publisherPALGRAVE MACMILLAN LTD-
dc.titleWhen to go it alone: Examining post-conversion performance of international joint ventures-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.wosid000477019700007-
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-85060911191-
dc.type.rimsART-
dc.citation.volume50-
dc.citation.issue6-
dc.citation.beginningpage998-
dc.citation.endingpage1020-
dc.citation.publicationnameJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES-
dc.identifier.doi10.1057/s41267-018-00211-7-
dc.contributor.localauthorChang, Sea-Jin-
dc.description.isOpenAccessN-
dc.type.journalArticleArticle-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorinternational joint ventures-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorwholly owned subsidiaries-
dc.subject.keywordAuthoracquisition-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorincomplete contract theory-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorproperty rights theory-
dc.subject.keywordAuthorperformance-
dc.subject.keywordPlusWHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARIES-
dc.subject.keywordPlusENTRY MODE-
dc.subject.keywordPlusTRANSACTION COST-
dc.subject.keywordPlusASSET OWNERSHIP-
dc.subject.keywordPlusPROPERTY-RIGHTS-
dc.subject.keywordPlusCHOICE-
dc.subject.keywordPlusINSTABILITY-
dc.subject.keywordPlusALLOCATION-
dc.subject.keywordPlusOPTION-
dc.subject.keywordPlusCHINA-
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