SGX-Tor: A Secure and Practical Tor Anonymity Network With SGX Enclaves

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With Tor being a popular anonymity network, many attacks have been proposed to break its anonymity or leak information of a private communication on Tor. However, guaranteeing complete privacy in the face of an adversary on Tor is especially difficult, because Tor relays are under complete control of world-wide volunteers. Currently, one can gain private information, such as circuit identifiers and hidden service identifiers, by running Tor relays and can even modify their behaviors with malicious intent. This paper presents a practical approach to effectively enhancing the security and privacy of Tor by utilizing Intel SGX, a commodity trusted execution environment. We present a design and implementation of Tor, called SGX-Tor, that prevents code modification and limits the information exposed to untrusted parties. We demonstrate that our approach is practical and effectively reduces the power of an adversary to a traditional network-level adversary. Finally, SGX-Tor incurs moderate performance overhead; the end-to-end latency and throughput overheads for HTTP connections are 3.9% and 11.9%, respectively.
Publisher
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
Issue Date
2018-10
Language
English
Article Type
Article
Keywords

ATTACKS

Citation

IEEE-ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING, v.26, no.5, pp.2174 - 2187

ISSN
1063-6692
DOI
10.1109/TNET.2018.2868054
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/246528
Appears in Collection
EE-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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