The Effects of Corporate Venture Capital, Founder Incumbency, and Their Interaction on Entrepreneurial Firms' R&D Investment Strategies

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Corporate venture capital (CVC) investment has increasingly become an important source of entrepreneurial finance. Accordingly, while scholars have traditionally focused on understanding the main motivations behind CVC activity and its impact on the investing corporate firm, more recently, scholars have also started to emphasize the importance of understanding the impact of CVC investment on the investee venture. In particular, these recent studies commonly show that CVC investment has a positive effect on the venture's innovation. While the positive link between CVC investment and the venture's innovation output is well established in the literature, the organizational mechanisms through which this relationship unfolds within the venture remain relatively underexplored. In this study, we fill this gap in the literature by examining the effects of CVC ownership, founder incumbency, and the CVC investor-founder interaction on research and development (R&D) investment strategies in venture capital (VC)-financed, technology-based entrepreneurial ventures. In doing so, we aim to provide a novel explanation of the organizational mechanisms that lead to greater investment in research and development (R&D), especially with regard to the interaction between CVC investors and founder managers. We argue that CVC ownership and founder incumbency positively affect entrepreneurial firms' R&D investment and, more importantly, that the CVC ownership effect is effectively amplified when the founder is an incumbent top manager because of goal congruence and knowledge spillover from the CVC firm. Our empirical analysis supports our hypotheses while addressing potential endogeneity concerns. Our results also support various mechanisms by utilizing the data on CVC investor's board membership, CVC investor heterogeneity, the founder's technological background, and the investee venture's industry.
Publisher
INFORMS
Issue Date
2017-07
Language
English
Article Type
Article
Keywords

OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP; INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES; WEAK INSTRUMENTS; PROPENSITY SCORE; DELAYED REWARDS; INNOVATION; PERFORMANCE; SURVIVAL; CAUSAL

Citation

ORGANIZATION SCIENCE, v.28, no.4, pp.670 - 689

ISSN
1047-7039
DOI
10.1287/orsc.2017.1133
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/244597
Appears in Collection
MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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