Buyers alliances for bargaining power
We provide a novel explanation as to why forming an alliance of buyers (or sellers) across separate markets can be advantageous when input prices are determined by bargaining. Our explanation helps to understand the prevalence of buyer cooperatives among small and medium-sized firms.
- Publisher
- M I T PRESS
- Issue Date
- 2004
- Language
- English
- Article Type
- Article
- Keywords
COUNTERVAILING-POWER; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; VERTICAL MERGERS; EQUILIBRIUM; HYPOTHESIS; INDUSTRY; FIRM
- Citation
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, v.13, no.4, pp.731 - 754
- ISSN
- 1058-6407
- Appears in Collection
- MG-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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