Optimal access pricing with interconnection obligation

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In view of the recent regulatory trend that the incumbent is mandated to provide its own bottleneck facilities to entrants when requested, it is more reasonable to take an entrant than the incumbent as the one who plays a leader role, Given this regulatory framework, the present paper examines under what conditions the ECPR or marginal cost pricing is socially optimal. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science BY. All rights reserved.
Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Issue Date
2001-09
Language
English
Article Type
Article
Keywords

COMPETITION

Citation

INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY, v.13, no.3, pp.331 - 338

ISSN
0167-6245
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/3885
Appears in Collection
MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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