Corporate Lobbying in Antidumping Cases: Looking into the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act

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Is protection for sale? In this research, we examine the effect of corporate lobbying on the disbursement of proceeds of the recent antidumping petitions under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, the so-called Byrd amendment. With the use of novel U.S. Customs Service data on the disbursements of the antidumping duties to the injured firms, we find that the petitioning firms that spend more on lobbying gain larger proceeds. We conclude that firms that lobby are the ones that get protection, not necessarily the healthy ones.
Publisher
SPRINGER
Issue Date
2010-10
Language
English
Article Type
Article
Keywords

BYRD AMENDMENT; POLITICAL STRATEGY; STEEL-INDUSTRY; RENT-SEEKING; PROTECTION; PARTICIPATION; DETERMINANTS; COMMISSION; ECONOMY; FIRMS

Citation

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS, v.96, no.3, pp.467 - 478

ISSN
0167-4544
DOI
10.1007/s10551-010-0478-1
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10203/21465
Appears in Collection
MT-Journal Papers(저널논문)
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